CHAPTER X
Likewise on the same topics; and how otherwise they can be
correctly explained.
IT is also a fair interpretation that it was by that same holy
will by which the son wished to die for the salvation of the world, that the
Father gave him commandment (yet not by compulsion), and the cup of suffering,
and spared him not, but gave him up for us and desired his death; and that the
Son himself was obedient even unto death, and learned obedience from the things
which he suffered. For as with regard to that will which led him to a holy
life, he did not have it as a human being of himself, but of the Father; so
also that will by which he desired to die for the accomplishment of so great
good, he could not have had but from the Father of lights, from
whom
is every good and perfect gift. And as the Father is said to draw by imparting
an inclination, so there is nothing improper in asserting that he moves man.
For as the Son says of the Father: "No man cometh to me except the Father
draw him," he might as well have said, except he move him. In like manner,
also, could he have declared: "No man layeth down his life for my sake,
except the Father move or draw him." For since a man is drawn or moved by
his will to that which he invariably chooses, it is not improper to say that
God draws or moves him when he gives him this will. And in this drawing or
impelling it is not to be understood that there is any constraint, but a free
and grateful clinging to the holy will which has been given. If then it cannot
be denied that the Father drew or moved the Son to death by giving him that
will; who does not see that, in the same manner, he gave him commandment to
endure death of his own accord and to take the cup, which he freely drank. And
if it is right to say that the Son spared not himself, but gave himself for us
of his own will, who will deny that it is right to say that the Father, of whom
he had this will, did not spare him but gave him up for us, and desired his
death? In this way, also, by following the will received from the Father
invariably, and of his own accord, the Son became obedient to Him, even unto
death; and learned obedience from the things which he suffered; that is, be
learned how great was the work to be accomplished by obedience. For this is
real and sincere obedience when a rational being, not of compulsion, but
freely, follows the will received from God. In other ways, also, we can
properly explain the Father's desire that the Son should die, though these
would appear sufficient.
For as we say that he
desires a thing who causes another to desire it; so, also, we say that he
desires a thing who approves of the desire of another, though he does not cause
that desire. Thus when we see a man who desires to endure pain with fortitude
for the accomplishment of some good design; though we acknowledge that we wish
to have him endure that pain, yet we do not choose, nor take pleasure in, his
suffering, but in his choice. We are, also, accustomed to say that he who can
prevent a thing but does not, desires the thing which he does not prevent.
Since, therefore, the will of the Son pleased the Father, and he did not
prevent him from choosing, or from fulfilling his choice, it is proper to say
that he wished the Son to endure death so piously and for so great an object,
though he was not pleased with his suffering. Moreover, he said that the cup
must not pass from him, except he drank it, not because he could not have
escaped death had he chosen to; but because, as has been said, the world could
not otherwise be saved; and it was his fixed choice to suffer death, rather
than that the world should not be saved. It was for
this reason, also,
that he used those words, viz., to teach the human race that there was no other
salvation for them but by his death; and not to show that he had no power at
all to avoid death. For whatsoever things are said of him, similar to these
which have been mentioned, they are all to be explained in accordance with the
belief that he died, not by compulsion, but of free choice. For he was
omnipotent, and it is said of him, when he was offered up, that he desired it.
And he says himself: "I lay down my life that I may take it again; no man
taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself; I have power
to
lay it down, and I have power to take it again." A man cannot, therefore,
be properly said to have been driven to a thing which he does of his own power
and will.
Boso. But this simple fact, that God allows him to be
so treated, even if he were willing, does not seem becoming for such a Father
in respect to such a Son.
Anselm. Yes, it is of all things most proper that
such a Father should acquiesce with such a Son in his desire, if it be
praiseworthy as relates to the honor of God, and useful for man's salvation,
which would not otherwise be effected.
Boso. The question which still troubles us is, how
the death of the Son can be proved reasonable and necessary. For otherwise, it
does not seem that the Son ought to desire it, or the Father compel or permit
it. For the question is, why God could not save man in some other way, and if
so, why he wished to do it in this way? For it both seems unbecoming for God to
have saved man in this way; and it is not clear how the death of the Son avails
for the salvation of man. For it is a strange thing if God so delights in, or
requires, the blood of the innocent, that he neither chooses, nor is able, to
spare the guilty without the sacrifice of the innocent.
Anselm. Since, in this inquiry, you take the place of
those who are unwilling to believe anything not previously proved by reason, I
wish to have it understood between us that we do not admit anything in the
least unbecoming to be ascribed to the Deity, and that we do not reject the smallest
reason if it be not opposed by a greater. For as it is impossible to attribute
anything in the least unbecoming to God; so
any
reason, however small, if not overbalanced by a greater, has the force of
necessity.
Boso. In this matter, I accept nothing more willingly
than that this agreement should be preserved between us in common.
Anselm. The question concerns only the incarnation of
God, and those things which we believe with regard to his taking human nature.
Boso. It is so.
Anselm. Let us suppose, then, that the incarnation of
God, and the things that we affirm of him as man, had never taken place; and be
it agreed between us that man was made for happiness, which cannot be attained
in this life, and that no being can ever arrive at happiness, save by freedom
from sin, and that no man passes this life without sin. Let us take for
granted, also, the other things, the belief of which is necessary for eternal
salvation.
Boso. I grant it; for in these there is nothing which
seems unbecoming or impossible for God.
Anselm. Therefore, in order that man may attain
happiness, remission of sin is necessary.
Boso. We all hold this.
